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ABSTRACT. Motivated by the quantum algorithm for testing commutativity of black-box groups
(Magniez and Nayak, 2007), we study the following problem: Given a black-box finite ring by an
additive generating set and a multilinear polynomial over that ring, also accessed as a black-box
function (we allow the indeterminates of the polynomial to be commuting or noncommuting), we
study the problem of testing if the polynomial is an identity for the given ring. We give a quantum
algorithm with query complexity sub-linear in the number of generators for the ring, when the number
of indeterminates of the input polynomial is small (ideally a constant). Towards a lower bound, we
also show a reduction from a version of the collision problem (which is well studied in quantum
computation) to a variant of this problem.
1. Introduction
For any finite ring (R,+, ·) the ring R[x1, x2, · · · , xm] is the ring of polynomials in com-
muting variables x1, x2, · · · , xm and coefficients in R. The ring R{x1, x2, · · · , xm} is the ring of
polynomials where the indeterminates xi are noncommuting. By noncommuting variables, we mean
xixj − xjxi 6= 0 for i 6= j.
For the algorithmic problem we study in this paper, we assume that the elements of the ring
(R,+, ·) are uniformly encoded by binary strings of length n and R = 〈r1, r2, · · · , rk〉 is given by
an additive generating set {r1, r2, · · · , rk}. That is,
R = {
∑
i
αiri | αi ∈ Z}.
Also, the ring operations of R are performed by black-box oracles for addition and multiplication
that take as input two strings encoding ring elements and output their sum or product (as the case
may be). Additionally, we assume that the zero element of R is encoded by a fixed string. The
black-box model for finite rings was introduced in [ADM06]. We now define the problem which
we study in this paper.
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The Multilinear Identity Testing Problem (MIT): The input to the problem is a black-box ring
R = 〈r1, · · · , rk〉 given by an additive generating set, and a multilinear polynomial f(x1, · · · , xm)
(in the ring R[x1, · · · , xm] or the ring R{x1, · · · , xm}) that is also given by a black-box access.
The problem is to test if f is an identity for the ring R. More precisely, the problem is to test if
f(a1, a2, · · · , am) = 0 for all ai ∈ R.
A natural example of an instance of this problem is the bivariate polynomial f(x1, x2) =
x1x2 − x2x1 over the ring R{x1, x2}. This is an identity for R precisely when R is a commutative
ring. Clearly, it suffices to check if the generators commute with each other, which gives a naive
algorithm that makes O(k2) queries to the ring oracles.
Given a polynomial f(x1, · · · , xm) and a black-box ring R by generators, we briefly discuss
some facts about the complexity of checking if f = 0 is an identity for R. The problem can be
NP-hard when the number of indeterminates m is unbounded, even when R is a fixed ring. To see
this, notice that a 3-CNF formula F (x1, · · · , xn) can be expressed as a O(n) degree multilinear
polynomial f(x1, x2, · · · , xn) over F2, by writing F in terms of addition and multiplication over
F2. It follows that f = 0 is an identity for F2 if and only if F is an unsatisfiable formula. However
in this paper we focus only on the upper and lower bounds on the query complexity of the problem.
In our query model, each ring operation, which is performed by a query to one of the ring
oracles, is of unit cost. Furthermore, we consider each evaluation of f(a1, · · · , am) to be of unit
cost for a given input (a1, · · · , am) ∈ Rm. This model is reasonable because we consider m as a
parameter that is much smaller than k.
The starting point of our study is a result of Magniez and Nayak in [MN07], where the authors
study the quantum query complexity of group commutativity testing: Let G be a finite black-box
group given by a generating set g1, g2, · · · , gk and the group operation is performed by a group
oracle. The algorithmic task is to check if G is commutative. For this problem the authors in
[MN07] give a quantum algorithm with query complexity O(k2/3 log k) and time complexity
O(k2/3 log2 k). Furthermore, a Ω(k2/3) lower bound for the quantum query complexity is also
shown. The main technical tool for their upper bound result was a method of quantization of ran-
dom walks first shown by Szegedy [Sze04]. More recently, Magniez et al in [MNRS07] discovered
a simpler and improved description of Szegedy’s method.
Our starting point is the observation that Magniez-Nayak result [MN07] for group commuta-
tivity can also be easily seen as a commutativity test for arbitrary finite black-box rings with similar
query complexity. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, notice that the commutativity testing for a
finite ring coincides with testing if the bivariate polynomial f(x1, x2) = x1x2− x2x1 is an identity
for the ring. Since f(x1, x2) is a multilinear polynomial, a natural question is, whether this approach
would extend to testing if any multilinear polynomial is an identity for a given ring. Motivated by
this connection, we study the problem of testing multilinear identities for any finite black-box ring.
The upper bound result in [MN07] is based on a group-theoretic lemma of Pak [Pak00]. Our
(query complexity) upper bound result takes an analogous approach. The main technical contri-
bution here is a suitable generalization of Pak’s lemma to a multilinear polynomial setting. The
multilinearity condition is crucially required. The rest of the proof is a suitable adaptation of the
Magniez-Nayak result.
For the lower bound result, we show a reduction to a somewhat more general version of MIT
from a problem that is closely related to the m-COLLISION problem studied in quantum com-
putation. The m-COLLISION problem is the following. Given a function f : {1, 2, · · · , k} →
{1, 2, · · · , k} as an oracle and a positive integer m, the task is to determine if there is some element
in the range of f with exactly m pre-images.
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We define the m-SPLIT COLLISION problem that is closely related to m-COLLISION problem.
Here the domain {1, 2, · · · , k} is partitioned into m equal-sized intervals (assume k is a multi-
ple of m) and the problem is to determine if there is some element in the range of f with ex-
actly one pre-image in each of the m intervals. We show a reduction from m-SPLIT COLLISION
to a general version of MIT. There is an easy randomized reduction from m-COLLISION prob-
lem to m-SPLIT COLLISION problem. The best known quantum query complexity lower bound for
m-COLLISION problem is Ω(k
2
3 ) [AS04] and thus we get the same lower bound for the general ver-
sion of MIT that we study. Improving, the current lower bound for m-COLLISION is an important
open problem in quantum computation since last few years. 1
Our reduction for lower bound is conceptually different from the lower bound proof in [MN07].
It uses ideas from automata theory to construct a suitable black-box ring. We recently used similar
ideas in the design of a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for identity testing of noncommu-
tative circuits computing small degree sparse polynomials [AMS08].
2. Black-box Rings and the Quantum Query model
We briefly explain the standard quantum query model. We modify the definition of black-box
ring operations by making them unitary transformations that can be used in quantum algorithms. For
a black-box ring R, we have two oracles OaR and OmR for addition and multiplication respectively.
For any two ring elements r, s, and a binary string t ∈ {0, 1}n we have OaR|r〉|s〉 = |r〉|r + s〉 and
OmR |r〉|s〉|t〉 = |r〉|s〉|rs ⊕ t〉, where the elements of R are encoded as strings in {0, 1}n. Notice
that OaR is a reversible function by virtue of (R,+) being an additive group. On the other hand,
(R, ·) does not have a group structure. Thus we have made OmR reversible by defining it as a 3-place
function OmR : {0, 1}3n → {0, 1}3n. When r or s do not encode ring elements these oracles can
compute any arbitrary string.
The query model in quantum computation is a natural extension of classical query model. The
basic difference is that a classical algorithm queries deterministically or randomly selected basis
states, whereas a quantum algorithm can query a quantum state which is a suitably prepared su-
perposition of basis states. Our query model closely follows the query model of Magniez-Nayak
[MN07, Section 2.2]. For black-box ring operations the query operators are simply OaR and OmR (as
defined above). For an arbitrary oracle function F : X → Y , the corresponding unitary operator
is OF : |g〉|h〉 → |g〉|h ⊕ F (g)〉. In the query complexity model, we charge unit cost for a single
query to the oracle and all other computations are free. We will assume that the input black-box
polynomial f : Rm → R is given by such an unitary operator Uf .
All the quantum registers used during the computation can be initialised to |0〉. Then a k-
query algorithm for a black-box ring is a sequence of k + 1 unitary operators and k ring oracle
operators: U0, Q1, U1, · · · , Uk−1, Qk, Uk where Qi ∈ {OaR, OmR , OF } are the oracle queries and
Ui’s are unitary operators. The final step of the algorithm is to measure designated qubits and
decide according to the measurement output.
3. Quantum Algorithm for Multilinear Identity Testing
In this section we describe our quantum algorithm for multilinear identity testing (MIT). Our
algorithm is motivated by (and based on) the group commutativity testing algorithm of Magniez
and Nayak [MN07]. We briefly explain the algorithm of Magniez-Nayak. Their problem is the
1Ambainis in [Amb07] show a quantum query complexity upper bound of O(km/m+1) for m-COLLISION problem.
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following: given a black-box group G by a set of generators g1, g2, · · · , gk, the task is to find
nontrivial upper bound on the quantum query complexity to determine whether G is commutative.
The group operators (corresponding to the oracle) are OG and OG−1 .
Note that for this problem, there is a trivial classical algorithm (so as quantum) of query com-
plexity O(k2). In an interesting paper, Pak showed a classical randomized algorithm of query com-
plexity O(k) for the same problem [Pak00]. Pak’s algorithm is based on the following observation
([Pak00, Lemma 1.3]): Consider a subproduct h = ge11 ge22 · · · gekk where ei’ s are picked uniformly
at random from {0, 1}. Then for any proper subgroup H of G, Prob[h 6∈ H] ≥ 1/2.
One important step of the algorithm in [MN07] is a generalization of Pak’s lemma. Let Vℓ be
the set of all distinct element ℓ tuples of elements from {1, 2, · · · , k}. For u = (u1, · · · , uℓ), define
gu = gu1 · gu2 · · · guℓ . Let p = ℓ(ℓ−1)+(k−ℓ)(k−ℓ−1)k(k−1) .
Lemma 3.1. [MN07] For any proper subgroup K of G, Probu∈Vℓ[gu 6∈ K] ≥ 1−p2 .
As a simple corollary of this lemma, Magniez and Nayak show in [MN07] that, if G is non
abelian then for randomly picked u and v from Vℓ the elements gu and gv will not commute with
probability at least (1−p)
2
4 . Thus, for non abelian G there will be at least
(1−p)2
4 fraction of noncom-
muting pairs (u, v). Call such pairs as marked pairs. Next, their idea is to do a random walk in the
space of all pairs and to decide whether there exists a marked pair. They achieved this by defining
a random walk and quantizing it using [Sze04]. We briefly recall the setting from [MN07, Section
2.3], and the main theorem from [Sze04], which is the central to the analysis of Magniez-Nayak
result.
3.0.1. Quantum Walks. Let P be an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain on a graph G = (V,E)
with n vertices. A walk following such a Markov chain is always ergodic and has unique stationary
distribution. Let P (u, v) denote the transition probability from u → v, and M be a set of marked
nodes of V . The goal is to make a walk on the vertices of G following the transition matrix P and
decide whether M is nonempty. Assume that every node v ∈ V is associated with a database D(v)
from which we can determine whether v ∈ M . This search procedure is modelled by a quantum
walk. To analyze the performance of the search procedure, we need to consider the cost of the
following operations:
Set up Cost (S): The cost to set up D(v) for v ∈ V .
Update Cost (U): The cost to update D(v), i.e. to update from D(v) to D(v′), where the move
v → v′ is according to the transition matrix P .
Checking Cost (C): To check whether v ∈M using D(v).
The costs are specific to the application for e.g. it can be query complexity or time complexity.
The problem that we consider or the group commutativity problem of Magniez-Nayak, concern
about query complexity. The following theorem due to Szegedy gives a precise analysis of the total
cost involved in the quantum walk.
Theorem 3.2. [Sze04] Let P be the transition matrix of an ergodic, symmetric Markov Chain on
a graph G = (V,E) and δ be the spectral gap of P . Also, let M be the set of all marked vertices
in V and |M |/|V | ≥ ǫ > 0, whenever M is nonempty. Then there is a quantum algorithm which
determines whether M is nonempty with constant success probability and cost S+O((U+C)/
√
δǫ).
S is the set up cost of the quantum process, U is the update cost for one step of the walk and C is
the checking cost.
Later, Magniez-Nayak-Ronald-Santha [MNRS07] improve the total cost of the quantum walk.
We state their main result.
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Theorem 3.3. [MNRS07] Let P be the transition matrix of a reversible, ergodic Markov Chain on
a graph G = (V,E) and δ be the spectral gap of P . Also let M be the set of all marked vertices
in V and |M |/|V | ≥ ǫ > 0, whenever M is nonempty. Then there is a quantum algorithm which
determines whether M is nonempty and in that case finds an element of M , with constant success
probability and cost of order S + 1√
ǫ
( 1√
δ
U + C). S is the set up cost of the quantum process, U is
the update cost for one step of the walk and C is the checking cost.
The analysis of Magniez-Nayak [MN07] is based on Theorem 3.2. For our problem also, we
follow similar approach.
3.1. Query Complexity Upper Bound
Now we describe our quantum algorithm for MIT. Our main technical contribution is a suitable
generalization of Pak’s lemma. For any i ∈ [m], consider the set Ri ⊆ R defined as follows:
Ri = {u ∈ R | ∀(b1, · · · , bi−1, bi+1, · · · , bm) ∈ Rm−1, f(b1, · · · , bi−1, u, bi+1, · · · , bm) = 0}
Clearly, if f is not a zero function from Rm → R, then |Ri| < |R|. In the following lemma,
we prove that if f is not a zero function then |Ri| ≤ |R|/2.
Lemma 3.4. Let R be any finite ring and f(x1, x2, · · · , xm) be a multilinear polynomial over R
such that f = 0 is not an identity for R. For i ∈ [m] define
Ri = {u ∈ R | ∀(b1, · · · , bi−1, bi+1, · · · , bm) ∈ Rm−1, f(b1, · · · , bi−1, u, bi+1, · · · , bm) = 0}.
Then Ri is an additive coset of a proper additive subgroup of R and hence |Ri| ≤ |R|/2.
Proof. Write f = A(x1, · · · , xi−1, xi, xi+1, · · · , xm) + B(x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xm) where A
is the sum of all the monomials of f containing xi and B is the sum of the rest of the monomials. Let
v1, v2 be any two distinct elements in Ri. Then for any fixed y¯ = (y1, · · · , yi−1, yi+1, · · · , ym) ∈
Rm−1, consider the evaluation of A and B over the points (y1, · · · , yi−1, v1, yi+1, · · · , ym) and
(y1, · · · , yi−1, v2, yi+1, · · · , ym) respectively. For convenience, we abuse the notation and write,
A(v1, y¯) +B(y¯) = A(v2, y¯) +B(y¯) = 0,
where y¯ is an assignment to x1, x2, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xk and v1, v2 are the assignments to xi
respectively. Note that, as f is a multilinear polynomial, the above relation in turns implies that
A(v1 − v2, y¯) = 0.
Consider the set Rˆi, defined as follows: Fix any u(i) ∈ Ri,
Rˆi = {w − u(i) | w ∈ Ri}.
We claim that Rˆi is an (additive) subgroup of R. We only need to show that Rˆi is closed under
the addition (of R). Consider (w1 − u(i)), (w2 − u(i)) ∈ Rˆi. Then (w1 − u(i)) + (w2 − u(i)) =
(w1 +w2−u(i))−u(i). It is now enough to show that for any y¯ ∈ Rm−1, f(w1+w2−u(i), y¯) = 0
(note that w1 +w2 + u(i) is an assignment to xi). Again using the fact that f is multilinear, we can
easily see the following:
f(w1 +w2 − u(i), y¯) = A(w1, y¯) +A(w2, y¯)−A(u(i), y¯) +B(y¯)
and,
A(w1, y¯) +A(w2, y¯)−A(u(i), y¯) +B(y¯) = A(w2, y¯)−A(u(i), y¯) = 0.
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Note that the last equality follows because x2 and u are in Ri. Hence we have proved that Rˆi
is a subgroup of R. So Ri = Rˆi + u(i) i.e. Ri is a coset of Rˆi inside R. Also |Ri| < |R| (f is not
identically zero over R). Thus, finally we get |Ri| = |Rˆi| ≤ |R|/2.
Our quantum algorithm is based on the algorithm of [MN07]. In the rest of the paper we denote
by Sℓ the set of all ℓ size subsets of {1, 2, · · · , k}. We follow a quantization of a random walk on
Sℓ × · · · × Sℓ = Smℓ . For u = {u1, u2, · · · , uℓ}, define ru = ru1 + · · · + ruℓ . Now, we suitably
adapt Lemma 1 of [MN07] in our context. 2
Let R be a finite ring given by a additive generating set S = {r1, · · · , rk}. W.l.o.g. assume
that r1 is the zero element of R. Let Rˆ be a proper additive subgroup of (R,+). Let j be the least
integer in [k] such that rj 6∈ Rˆ. Since Rˆ is a proper subgroup of R, such a j always exists.
Lemma 3.5. Let Rˆ < R be a proper additive subgroup of R and T be an additive coset of Rˆ in R.
Then Probu∈Sℓ [ru 6∈ T ] ≥ 1−p2 , where p = ℓ(ℓ−1)+(k−ℓ)(k−ℓ−1)k(k−1) .
Proof. Let j be the least integer in [k] such that rj 6∈ Rˆ. Fix a set u of size ℓ such that 1 ∈ u and
j 6∈ u. Denote by v the set obtained from u by deleting 1 and inserting j. This defines a one to
one correspondence (matching) between all such pair of (u, v). Moreover rv = ru + rj (notice that
r1 = 0). Then at least one of the element ru or rv is not in T . For otherwise (rv−ru) ∈ Rˆ implying
rj ∈ Rˆ, which is a contradiction.
Therefore,
Probu∈Sℓ [ru ∈ T | j ∈ u xor 1 ∈ u] ≤
1
2
.
For any two indices i, j,
Probu∈Sℓ [i, j ∈ u or i, j 6∈ u] =
ℓ(ℓ− 1) + (k − ℓ)(k − ℓ− 1)
k(k − 1) = p.
Thus,
Probu∈Sℓ [ru ∈ T ] ≤ (1− p)/2 + p ≤ (1 + p)/2.
This completes the proof.
Let T = Ri in Lemma 3.5, where Ri is as defined in Lemma 3.4.
Suppose f = 0 is not an identity for the ring R. Then, using Lemma 3.5, it is easy to see
that, for u1, u2, · · · , um picked uniformly at random from Sℓ, f(ru1, · · · , rum) is non zero with
non-negligible probability. This is analogous to [MN07, Lemma 2]. We include a proof for the sake
of completeness.
Lemma 3.6. Let f(x1, · · · , xm) be a multilinear polynomial (in commuting or noncommuting in-
determinates) over R such that f = 0 is not an identity for the ring R. Then,
Probu1,··· ,um∈Sℓ [f(ru1 , · · · , rum) 6= 0] ≥
(
1− p
2
)m
.
Proof. For i ∈ [m], let Ri be the additive coset defined in Lemma 3.4. The proof is by simple
induction on m. The proof for the base case of the induction (i.e for m = 1) follows easily from
the definition of Ri and Lemma 3.5. By induction hypothesis assume that the result holds for all
t-variate multilinear polynomials g such that g = 0 is not an identity for R with t ≤ m− 1.
2Notice that in [MN07], the author consider the set of all ℓ tuples instead of subsets. This is important for them as
they work in non abelian structure in general (where order matters). But we will be interested only over additive abelian
structure of a ring and thus order does not matter for us.
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Consider the given multilinear polynomial f(x1, x2, · · · , xm). Then, by Lemma 3.4, Rm is
a coset of an additive subgroup Rˆm inside R. Pick um ∈ Sℓ uniformly at random. If f = 0 is
not an identity on R then by Lemma 3.5 we get rum 6∈ Rm with probability at least 1−p2 . Let
g(x1, x2, · · · , xm−1) = f(x1, · · · , xm−1, rum). Since rum 6∈ Rm with probability at least 1−p2 , it
follows that g = 0 is not an identity on R with probability at least 1−p2 . Given that g is not an
identity for R, by induction hypothesis we have that, Probu1,··· ,um−1∈Sℓ [g(ru1 , · · · , rum−1) 6= 0] ≥(
1−p
2
)m−1
. Hence we get, Probu1,··· ,um∈Sℓ [f(ru1 , · · · , rum) 6= 0] ≥
(
1−p
2
)m
, which proves the
lemma.
We observe two simple consequences of Lemma 3.6. Notice that 1−p2 =
ℓ(k−ℓ)
k(k−1) . Letting
ℓ = 1 we get 1−p2 = 1/k, and Lemma 3.6 implies that if f = 0 is not an identity for R then
f(a1, · · · , am) 6= 0 for one of the km choices for the ai from the generating set {r1, · · · , rk}.
Letting ℓ = k/2 in Lemma 3.6, we get 1−p2 ≥ 1/4. Hence we obtain the following randomized
test which makes 4mmk queries.
Corollary 3.7. There is a randomized 4mmk query algorithm for MIT with constant success prob-
ability, where f is m-variate and R is given by an additive generating set of size k. This can be
seen as a generalization of Pak’s O(k) query randomized test for group commutativity.
We use Lemma 3.6 to design our quantum algorithm. Technically, our quantum algorithm is
similar to the one described in [MN07]. The Lemma 3.6 is used to guarantee that there will at least(
1−p
2
)m
fraction of marked points in the space Smℓ i.e. the points where f evaluates to non-zero.
The underlying graph in our random walk is a Johnson Graph and our analysis require some simple
modification of the analysis described in [MN07].
3.1.1. Random walk on Sℓ. Our random walk can be described as a random walk over a graph
G = (V,E) defined as follows: The vertices of G are all possible ℓ subsets of [k]. Two vertices are
connected by an edge whenever the corresponding sets differ by exactly one element. Notice that G
is a connected ℓ(k − ℓ)-regular Johnson graph, with parameter (k, ℓ, ℓ− 1) [BCN89]. Let P be the
normalized adjacency matrix of G with rows and columns are indexed by the subsets of [k]. Then
PXY = 1/ℓ(k − ℓ) if |X ∩ Y | = ℓ− 1 and 0 otherwise. It is well known that the spectral gap δ of
P (δ = 1−λ, where λ is the second largest eigenvalue of P ) is Ω(1/ℓ) for ℓ ≤ k/2 [BCN89]. Now
we describe the random walk on G.
Let the current vertex is u = {u1, u2, · · · , uℓ} and ru = ru1 +ru2 + · · ·+ruℓ . With probability
1/2 stay at u and with probability 1/2 do the following: randomly pick ui ∈ u and j ∈ [k]\u. Then
move to vertex v such that v is obtained from u by removing ui and inserting j. Compute rv by
simply subtracting rui from ru and adding rj to it. That will only cost 2 oracle access. Staying in any
vertex with probability 1/2 ensures that the random walk is ergodic. So the stationary distribution
of the random walk is always uniform. It is easy to see that the transition matrix of the random walk
is A = (I + P )/2 where I is the identity matrix of suitable dimension. So the spectral gap of the
transition matrix A is δˆ = (1− λ)/2 = δ/2.
The query complexity analysis is similar to the analysis of Magniez-Nayak. But to fit it with
our requirement, we need some careful parameter setting. We include a brief self-contained proof.
Theorem 3.8. Let R be a finite black-box ring given as an oracle and f(x1, · · · , xm) be a mul-
tilinear polynomial over R given as a black-box. Moreover let {r1, · · · , rk} be a given additive
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generating set for R. Then the quantum query complexity of testing whether f is an identity for R,
is O(m(1 + α)m/2k
m
m+1 ), assuming k ≥ (1 + 1/α)m+1.
Proof. Setup cost(S): For the quantum walk step we need to start with an uniform distribution on
Smℓ . With each u ∈ Sℓ, we maintain a quantum register |du〉 that computes ru. So we need to
prepare the following state |Ψ〉:
|Ψ〉 = 1√|Smℓ |
∑
u1,u2,··· ,um∈Smℓ
|u1, ru1〉 ⊗ |u2, ru2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |um, rum〉.
It is easy to see that to compute any ruj , we need ℓ − 1 oracle access to the ring oracle. Since in
each of m independent walk, quantum queries over all choices of u will be made in parallel (using
quantum superposition), the total query cost for setup is m(ℓ− 1).
Update cost(U): It is clear from the random walk described in the section 3.1.1, that the update
cost over Sℓ is only 2 oracle access. Thus for the random walk on Smℓ which is just m independent
random walks, one on each copy of Sℓ, we need a total update cost 2m.3
Checking cost(C): To check whether f is zero on a point during the walk, we simply query the
oracle for f once.
Recall from Szegedy’s result [Sze04] (as stated in Theorem 3.2), the total cost for query com-
plexity is Q = S + 1√
δˆǫ
(U + C) where ǫ =
(
1−p
2
)m
is the proportion of the marked elements
and δˆ is the spectral gap of the transition matrix A described in section 3.1.1. Combining to-
gether we get, Q ≤ m
[
(ℓ− 1) + 3√
δˆǫ
]
. From the random walk described in the section 3.1.1,
we know that δˆ ≥ 12ℓ . Hence, Q ≤ m
[
(ℓ− 1) + 3
√
2ℓ
( 1−p2 )
m
2
]
. Notice that, 1−p2 =
ℓ
k
(
1− ℓ
k
1− 1
k
)
.
Substituting for 1−p2 we get, Q ≤ m
[
(ℓ− 1) + 3√2km/2 1
ℓ
m−1
2 ( k−ℓk−1)
m/2
]
. We will choose
a suitably small α > 0 so that k−1k−ℓ < 1 + α. Then we can upper bound Q as follows.
Q ≤ m
[
(ℓ− 1) + 3√2 · (1 + α)m/2km/2 1
ℓ
m−1
2
]
. Now our goal is to minimize Q with respect
to ℓ and α. For that we choose ℓ = kt where we will fix t appropriately in the analysis. Substituting
ℓ = kt we get, Q ≤ m
[
(kt − 1) + 3√2 · (1 + α)m/2t1/2km−(m−1)t2
]
. Choosing t = (m/(m+1)),
we can easily see that the query complexity of the algorithm is O(m(1 + α)m/2k
m
m+1 ). Finally,
recall that we need choose an α > 0 so that k−1k−ℓ ≤ 1 + α. Clearly, it suffices to choose α so that
(1 + α)ℓ ≤ αk. Letting ℓ = km/m+1 we get the constraint (1 + 1/α)m+1 ≤ k which is satisfied if
e(m+1)/α ≤ k. We can choose α = m+1ln k .
Remark 3.9. The choice of α in the above theorem shows some trade-offs in the query complexity
between the parameters k and m. For constant m notice that this gives us an O(km/m+1) query
complexity upper bound for the quantum algorithm, which is similar to the best known query upper
bound for m-COLLISION [Amb07], when the problem instance is a function f : [k]→ [k].
Generalized Multilinear Identity Testing (GMIT): We now consider a variant of the MIT problem,
which we call GMIT (for generalized-MIT).
3In [MN07] the underlying group operation is not necessarily commutative (it is being tested for commutativity). Thus
the update cost is more.
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Let f : Rm → R be a black-box multilinear polynomial. Consider any additive subgroup A of
the black-box ring R, given by a set of generators r1, r2, · · · , rk, so that A = {
∑
i βiri | βi ∈ Z}.
The GMIT(R,A, f) problem is the following: test whether a black-box multilinear polynomial f is
an identity for A. In other words, we need to test if f(a1, · · · , am) = 0 for all ai ∈ A.
It is easy to observe that the quantum algorithm actually solves GMIT and the correctness proof
and analysis given in Theorem 3.8 also hold for GMIT problem. We summarize this observation in
the following theorem.
Theorem 3.10. Let R be a black-box finite ring given by ring oracles and A = 〈r1, r2, · · · , rk〉
be an additive subgroup of R given by generators ri ∈ R. Let f(x1, x2, · · · , xm) be a black-box
multilinear polynomial f : Rm → R. Then there is a quantum algorithm with query complexity
O(m(1 + α)m/2k
m
m+1 ) for the GMIT(R,A, f) problem (assuming k ≥ (1 + 1/α)m+1).
4. Query Complexity Lower Bound
In this section we show that GMIT problem of multilinear identity testing for additive subgroups
of a black-box ring (described in Section 3.1.1), is at least as hard as m-SPLIT COLLISION (again,
m-SPLIT COLLISION problem is defined in Section 1). Also, the well-known m-COLLISION prob-
lem can be easily reduced to m-SPLIT COLLISION problem using a simple randomized reduction.
In the following lemma, we briefly state the reduction.
Lemma 4.1. There is a randomized reduction from m-COLLISION to m-SPLIT COLLISION with
success probability close to e−m.
Proof. Let f : [k] → [k] be a ‘yes’ instance of m-COLLISION, and suppose f−1(i) =
{i1, i2, · · · , im}. To reduce this instance to m-SPLIT COLLISION we pick a random m-partition
I1, I2, · · · , Im of the domain [k] with each |Ij | = k/m. It is easy to see that, with probability close
to e−m, the set {i1, i2, · · · , im} will be a split collision for the function f .
Consequently, showing a quantum lower bound of Ω(kα) for m-COLLISION will imply a quan-
tum lower bound of Ω(kα/em) for m-SPLIT COLLISION. It will also show similar lower bound for
GMIT because of our reduction.
If f : [k] → [k] is an instance of m-SPLIT COLLISION problem, then the classical randomized
query complexity lower bound is Ω(k). This is observed in [MN07] for m = 2. Due to our
reduction, we get similar randomized query complexity lower bound for GMIT.
Currently the best known quantum query complexity lower bound for m-COLLISION prob-
lem is Ω(k2/3) (in the case m = 2) [AS04]. Thus we obtain the same explicit lower
bound for m-SPLIT COLLISION problem due to the random reduction from m-COLLISION to
m-SPLIT COLLISION. It also implies quantum query complexity lower bound for GMIT.
Our reduction from m-SPLIT COLLISION to GMIT problem is based on some new automata
theoretic ideas. We first describe necessary automata theoretic ideas those are useful for our reduc-
tion.
4.1. Automata theory background
We recall some standard automata theory notations (see, for example, [HU78]). Fix a finite
automaton A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, qf ) which takes as input strings in Σ∗. Q is the set of states of A,
Σ is the alphabet, δ : Q × Σ → Q is the transition function, and q0 and qf are the initial and
final states respectively (throughout, we only consider automata with unique accepting states). For
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each letter b ∈ Σ, let δb : Q → Q be the function defined by: δb(q) = δ(q, b). These functions
generate a submonoid of the monoid of all functions from Q to Q. This is the transition monoid of
the automaton A and is well-studied in automata theory: for example, see [Str94, page 55]. We now
define the 0-1 matrix Mb ∈ F|Q|×|Q| as follows: Mb(q, q′) = 1 if δb(q) = q′, and 0 otherwise.
The matrix Mb is simply the adjacency matrix of the graph of the function δb. As the entries of
Mb are only zeros and ones, we can consider Mb to be a matrix over any field F.
Furthermore, for any w = w1w2 · · ·wk ∈ Σ∗, we define the matrix Mw to be the matrix product
Mw1Mw2 · · ·Mwk . If w is the empty string, define Mw to be the identity matrix of dimension
|Q| × |Q|. For a string w, let δw denote the natural extension of the transition function to w. If w
is the empty string, δw is simply the identity function. It is easy to check that: Mw(q, q′) = 1 if
δw(q) = q
′ and 0 otherwise. Thus, Mw is also a matrix of zeros and ones for any string w. Also,
Mw(q0, qf ) = 1 if and only if w is accepted by the automaton A. We now describe the reduction.
Theorem 4.2. The m-SPLIT COLLISION problem reduces to GMIT problem for additive subgroups
of black-box rings.
Proof. An instance of m-SPLIT COLLISION is a function f : [k]→ [k] given as an oracle, where we
assume w.l.o.g. that k = nm. Divide {1, 2, · · · , k} into m intervals I1, I2, · · · , Im, each containing
n consecutive points of [k]. Recall from Section1 that, f is said to have an m-split collision if for
some j ∈ [k] we have |f−1(j)| = m and |f−1(j) ∩ Ii| = 1 for each interval Ii.
Consider the alphabet Σ = {b, c, b1, b2, · · · , bm}. Let A = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, qf ) be a deterministic
finite state automaton that accepts all strings w ∈ Σ∗ such that each bj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m occurs at least
once in w. It is easy to see that such an automaton with a single final state qf can be designed with
total number of states |Q| = 2O(m) = t. W.l.o.g. let the set of states Q be renamed as {1, 2, · · · , t},
where 1 is the initial state and t is the final state.
For each letter a ∈ Σ, let Ma denote the t×t transition matrix for δa (as defined in Section 4.1).
Since each Ma is a t×t 0-1 matrix, each Ma is in the ringMt(F2) of t×tmatrices with entries from
the field F2. Let R denote the k-fold product ring (Mt(F2))k. Clearly, R is a finite ring (which is
going to play the role of the black-box ring in our reduction). We now define an additive subgroup
T of R, where we describe the generating set of T using the m-SPLIT COLLISION instance f .
For each index i ∈ [k], define an k-tuple Ti ∈ R as follows. If i 6= f(i), then define Ti[i] = Mb,
Ti[f(i)] = Mbj (where i ∈ Ij) and and for each index s 6∈ {i, f(i)} define Ti[s] = Mc. For
i = f(i), define T [i] = Mbj (i ∈ Ij) and the rest of the entries as Mc. The additive subgroup of R
that we consider is T = 〈T1, T2, · · · , Tk〉 generated by the Ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Furthermore, define two t × t matrices A and B in Mt(F2) as follows. Let A[1, 1] = 1 and
A[u, ℓ] = 0 for (u, ℓ) 6= (1, 1). For the matrix B, let B[t, 1] = 1 and B[u, ℓ] = 0 for (u, ℓ) 6= (t, 1).
Claim 1. Let w = w1w2 · · ·ws ∈ Σ∗ be any string. Then the automaton A defined above accepts
w if and only if the matrix AMw1Mw2 · · ·MwsB is nonzero.
Proof of Claim By definition of the matrices Ma, the (1, t)th entry of the product Mw1Mw2 · · ·Mws
is 1 if and only if w is accepted by A. By definition of the matrices A and B the claim follows
immediately.
Now, consider the polynomial P (x1, x2, · · · , xm) with coefficients from the matrix ring R
defined as follows:
P (x1, x2, · · · , xm) = A¯x1x2 · · · xmB¯,
where A¯ = (A,A, . . . , A) ∈ R and B¯ = (B,B, · · · , B) ∈ R are k-tuples of A’s and B’s re-
spectively. We claim that the multilinear polynomial P (x1, x2, · · · , xm) = 0 is an identity for the
additive subgroup T if and only if f has no m-split collision.
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Claim 2. P (x1, · · · , xm) = 0 is an identity for the additive subgroup T = 〈T1, · · · , Tk〉 if and only
if f has no m-split collision. In other words, GMIT(R,T, P ) is an ‘yes’ instance if and only if f
has no m-split collision.
Proof of Claim Suppose f has an m-split collision. Specifically, let ij ∈ Ij (1 ≤ j ≤ m and
i1 < i2 < · · · < im) be indices such that f(i1) = · · · = f(im) = ℓ. In the polynomial P , we
substitute the indeterminate xj by Tij .
Then P (Ti1 , Ti2 , · · · , Tim) = A¯MB¯, where M = Ti1 · · ·Tim . M is a k-tuple of t× t matrices
such that the ℓth component of M is
∏m
j=1Mbj where ij ∈ Ij . Since bi1bi2 · · · bim ∈ Σ∗ is a length
m-string containing all the bj’s it will be accepted by the automaton A. Consequently, the (q0, qf )th
entry of the matrix M , which is the (1, t)th entry, is 1 (as explained in Section 4.1). It follows that
the (1, 1) entry of the matrix AMB is 1. Hence P = 0 is not an identity over the additive subgroup
T .
For the other direction, assume that f has no m-split collision. We need to show that P = 0 is
an identity for the ring T . For any m elements S1, S2, · · · , Sm ∈ T consider P (S1, S2, · · · , Sm) =
A¯S1S2 · · ·SmB¯. Since Each Sj is an F2-linear combination of the generators T1, · · · , Tk , it follows
by distributivity in the ring R that P (S1, S2, · · · , Sm) is an F2-linear combination of terms of the
form P (Tk1 , Tk2 , · · · , Tkm) for some m indices k1, · · · , km ∈ [k]. Thus, it suffices to show that
P (Tk1 , Tk2 , · · · , Tkm) = 0.
Let Tˆ = Tk1Tk2 · · ·Tkm . Then, for each j ∈ [k] we have Tˆ [j] = Tk1[j]Tk2 [j] · · · Tkm [j].
Since f has no m-split collision, for each j ∈ [N ] the set of matrices {Mb1 ,Mb2 , · · · ,Mbm} is not
contained in the set {T1[j], T2[j], · · · , Tk[j]}. Thus, Tˆ [j] = Tk1 [j]Tk2 [j] · · · Tkm [j] is a product of
matrices Mw1Mw2 · · ·Mwm for a word w = w1w2 · · ·wm that is not accepted byA. It follows from
the previous claim that ATˆ [j]B = 0. Hence P (Tk1 , Tk2 , · · · , Tkm) = 0 which completes the proof.
In Section 3.1, we have already shown a quantum algorithm of query complexity O(k
m
m+1 ) for
MIT (m is a constant). This bound holds as well for GMIT. We conclude this section by showing that
any algorithm of query complexity q(k,m) (q is any function) for GMIT will give an algorithm of
similar query complexity for m-COLLISION problem. In particular an algorithm for GMIT of query
complexity ko(m/m+1) will improve the best known algorithm for m-COLLISION problem due to
Ambainis [Amb07]. The following corollary is an easy consequence of Theorem 4.2.
Corollary 4.3. Let f : [k] → [k] be an instance of m-SPLIT COLLISION problem and
GMIT(R,T, P ) be an instance of GMIT problem, where the multilinear polynomial P : Rm → R
and T is an additive subgroup of G given by k generators. Then, if we have a quantum al-
gorithm of query complexity q(k,m) for GMIT problem, we will have a quantum algorithm for
m-SPLIT COLLISION with query complexity O(q(k,m)).
Proof. LetA be an algorithm for GMIT with quantum query complexity q(k,m). Given an instance
of m-SPLIT COLLISION, the generators for the additive subgroup T is indexed by 1, 2, · · · , k (as
defined in the proof of Theorem 4.2). Also, define the polynomial P (x1, x2, · · · , xm) So the inputs
of our GMIT problem are 1, 2, · · · , k and P . Using the algorithm A, we define another algorithm
A′ which does the following. When i ∈ [k] is invoked by A for the ring operation, the algorithm
A′ constructs the generator Ti by making only one query to the oracle for f . One more query to
the f -oracle is required to erase the output. Moreover, if A wants to check whether the output of
the ring operation is a valid generator (say Tj for some j), then also A′ uses just two queries to the
oracle of f . Thus we have an algorithm A′ for m-SPLIT COLLISION with query complexity 4q(k).
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Recall that the best known lower bound for m-SPLIT COLLISION problem is Ω(k2/3). Then,
combining Theorem 4.2 and Corollary 4.3, we get Ω(k2/3) quantum query lower bound for GMIT
problem.
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